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AUTHOR’S MAIN MESSAGE
More public enforcement can help reduce violations of labor regulations. Domestic and external factors have been 
identified in the literature as determinants of public enforcement; but, mainly because of lack of data, there is only 
partial understanding of the political economy of enforcement in the developing world. Furthermore, the potential 
simultaneous relationships between de jure labor regulations, enforcement, and economic outcomes is debated 
with strong opposing opinions and little empirical support. Policymakers have to understand local institutional 
particularities if they aim to design feasible welfare enhancing policies.
ELEVATOR PITCH
More than half of private sector employees in the 
developing world do not receive legally mandated labor 
benefits. These regulations have typically been enacted 
by democratically elected governments, and are valued 
by both formal and informal workers. Increasing public 
enforcement (e.g. inspections, fines, and workers’ 
access to the judiciary) can be a powerful tool to reduce 
violations (e.g. increase the number of employees 
earning above the minimum wage). Which factors 
determine enforcement, and whether enforcement 




Labor inspectors can be corrupted by lobby 
groups, particularly in countries that lack an 
autonomous civil service.
Enforcement can be politicized in countries that 
lack constraints on presidential power, serving 
as a tool to reward political allies and punish 
enemies.
When labor regulations are inadequate, 
enforcement can destroy productive employment 
and investment, particularly among low-skilled 
workers in small firms.
Pros
Enforcement reduces violations of labor 
regulations, improving the rule of law.
Workers who have access to legally mandated 
benefits are more likely to trust the state, and 
hence, to comply with their civic duties.
When labor regulations are adequate, 
enforcement can increase efficiency, thereby 
reducing market failures, leveling the playing field, 
reducing work-related injuries, and improving the 
income distribution.
Source: Author’s own compilation based on [1].
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MOTIVATION
Across the less developed world, governments have enacted employment, social security, 
and occupational health and safety regulations. Those regulations are usually de jure 
universal, with some notable exceptions such as firm size-based legislation in South Asia. 
In practice, however, estimates suggest that more than half of private sector employees 
in the developing world do not receive legally mandated labor benefits due to employer 
non-compliance. Enforcing labor regulations, however, can be controversial. On the one 
extreme, non-compliance is viewed as a way to achieve de facto flexibility and economic 
efficiency in countries where political distortions explain the existence of overly stringent 
labor laws. On the other extreme, non-compliance is viewed as capitalist abuse of workers 
and as an impediment to the effective implementation of policies that solve labor market 
failures.
This article focuses on two key concerns for policymakers in developing countries: first, 
should governments devote more resources and/or increase fines to enforce existing 
labor regulations? Are the social benefits of compliance higher than the potential costs of 
the destruction of informal jobs? Second, which domestic and external factors influence 
public enforcement? Who are the main actors and institutions, and how do they shape 
effective labor regulation? 
Despite some recent efforts and some interesting findings, the academic literature can 
only provide partial answers to these broad questions. This is in part due to lack of 
knowledge about the institutions responsible for enforcing labor regulations; and in part 
due to the complex relationship between de jure regulations, enforcement, and economic 
outcomes. 
DISCUSSION OF PROS AND CONS
Theoretically, quite a lot is known about enforcement of labor regulations. It is clear that 
the behavior of employers and workers not only depends on the letter of the labor code, 
but also on its effective implementation. Effective labor regulation (i.e. the combination 
of de jure regulations and enforcement) can have positive or negative effects on economic 
outcomes depending on the existence of market failures (e.g. firms with the power to 
set wages, or incomplete and asymmetric information about occupational hazards). 
Furthermore, even when market failures are pervasive, government intervention can 
either improve efficiency or make things worse. That is to say, a reasonably informed 
policy recommendation cannot be based exclusively on theoretical grounds; it requires 
country-specific empirical work. 
Providing sound empirical evidence, however, is quite challenging. First, it requires 
quantitative data and institutional knowledge on economic outcomes, labor codes, 
and government enforcement. Second, to compute a causal effect, the methodology 
needs to take into account the complex relationship among these three variables. 
There are reasons to suspect a simultaneous relationship, as shown in Figure 1. 
For example, not only do employers and workers react to effective regulation, but 
also legislators introduce reforms to the labor code based on the performance 
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of the labor market and the enforcement system. Furthermore, the institutions in 
charge of enforcing labor regulations (i.e. labor courts and inspection agencies) 
might determine their efforts based on the letter of the law, and the performance 
of the labor market. Finally, effects are likely to differ across labor markets due 
to variation in institutions and economic structure, making cross-country analysis 
problematic.
A clear example of the difficulties involved in providing solid empirical evidence can 
be found in a seminal 2004 study [2]. This influential paper made an important 
contribution by computing comparable measures of labor regulations across countries; 
it concluded that more stringent labor regulations have negative economic consequences 
such as higher unemployment, especially of the young. The evidence, however, suffers 
an important methodological weakness. Due to lack of enforcement data, the authors 
only use de jure measures of regulation, which biases the estimates when enforcement 
and laws are correlated. As shown in Figure 2, there is in fact a negative correlation: 
countries with more stringent labor laws tend to enforce less. Furthermore, a recent 
replication study finds that the negative correlation between labor regulation and 
economic outcomes found in the above work disappears when proxies of enforcement 
are included in the analysis [1].
Therefore, more research is necessary to make reasonably informed policy 
recommendations, particularly on the set of institutions in charge of enforcing labor 
regulations (courts, inspection agencies, and labor unions), and on the complex 
relationship between economic outcomes and effective labor regulation. The available 
evidence, however, already provides some useful partial answers. 
Figure 1. The complex relationship between labor markets, labor laws, and enforcement 
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Inspection resources in countries with a weak civil service
The number of labor inspectors per worker, and particularly the number of inspections, 
is substantially lower in less developed countries (Figure 3). 
Most scholars agree that devoting more resources to an autonomous labor inspectorate, 
that meets the requirements of a Weberian ideal of a bureaucracy (such as meritocracy), 
would result in higher compliance. Inspection agencies in developing countries, however, 
usually do not meet these standards. They are often subject to substantial political 
interference. This leads to the question: in a weak institutionalized environment, can 
more inspection resources produce higher compliance? Two studies from 2014 [3] and 
2010 [4] analyze the case of Argentina, a federal country where subnational jurisdictions 
are responsible for enforcing labor regulations. Despite the lack of an autonomous civil 
service, the evidence suggests that provinces that increase inspection resources and 
efforts experience fewer labor violations [4]. The 2014 study argues that this is because 
linkages between bureaucrats and allied civil society organizations (such as labor 
unions) facilitate routinized resource sharing and the construction of pro-enforcement 
coalitions [3].
Figure 2. Countries with more stringent labor laws tend to enforce less 
Source: Author’s own compilation based on Kanbur, R., and L. Ronconi. “Enforcement matters: The effective
regulation of labour.” International Labour Review 157:3 (2018): 331–356 [1].
Note: The plots show 172 countries. The horizontal axis is a ranking based on the employment law index, wherein
countries with more protective regulations have a higher ranking. The vertical axis is a ranking based on the
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Brazil is another interesting country to study. Since re-democratization in 1985, 
the labor inspectorate has been subject to substantial reform, leading to major 
improvements thanks to higher professionalization [5]. A 2012 study explores 
variation in labor inspections across municipalities in Brazil and also finds that a rise 
in inspections produces an increase in compliance with labor regulations, although at 
the cost of higher unemployment [6]. Empirical studies from Peru and South Africa, 
however, do not find a statistically significant relationship between labor inspections 
and compliance. 
Enforcement and efficiency
Some empirical studies suggest that enforcing stringent employment regulations reduces 
efficiency. For example, one recent study finds that increased enforcement in Brazil 
limits the plant-level productivity gains associated with a more global market [7]. Along 
the same lines, an earlier work exploits variation in labor inspection across Russian 
states and finds that strict enforcement suppresses labor demand [8]. Other studies, 
however, find positive economic effects. The 2008 study on Brazil, for instance, shows 
that labor inspectors have been able to improve workers’ rights without harming firms’ 
competitiveness (and in some cases, even enhancing it) [5]. And a 2015 study finds that 
a national campaign for minimum wages, implemented by the government of Costa Rica 
in 2010, produced higher compliance with minimum wages and other legally mandated 
workers’ benefits without reducing employment [9]. 
These contrasting results raise the question: why does more labor inspection have 
positive impacts in some cases but negative impacts in others? The literature provides 
two types of interpretation. The first interpretation, usually held by economists, stresses 
the presence (or not) of market failures. Finding that more inspections reduce efficiency 
is interpreted as evidence that the neoclassical model is an accurate description of the 
labor market. On the other hand, finding that more inspections improve efficiency is 
interpreted as evidence of important failures in the labor market (such as monopsony, 
Note: The figure covers the period from 2000 to 2012, but for the majority of countries the data collected only cover 
the last three years (2010–2012). “Inspectors” data are available for 197 countries and “inspections” data for 131. 
Source: Author’s own compilation based on Kanbur, R., and L. Ronconi. “Enforcement matters: The effective 
regulation of labour.” International Labour Review 157:3 (2018): 331−356 [1].







Figure 3. Number of labor inspectors and inspections across countries, 2000s
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that is, too much power among employers). The second interpretation, usually held by 
other social scientists, emphasizes differences in inspection styles. This school of thought 
assumes that in the developing world many firms are not well informed about labor 
regulations and, in some cases, are not maximizing profits. Following a strict punitive 
enforcement style in these cases can lead to resentment and unwillingness to cooperate. 
By contrast, if the labor inspector follows a more pedagogical style, it could achieve both 
higher compliance and firm productivity. Once again going back to the 2008 study on 
Brazil, the author argues that a combined enforcement strategy (where inspectors have 
discretion to decide whether to apply fines or offer education/assistance) “allow[s] labor 
inspectors to learn about the obstacles preventing firms from complying with the law and 
to develop innovative local solutions. These compliance solutions include technological 
improvements, adaptations of the regulation to local/industry circumstances, and the 
sorting out of unnecessary, costly and inapplicable bureaucratic requirements from 
relevant institutions protecting workers and organizing markets” [5]. That is, a holistic 
perspective that properly combines coercive and pedagogical enforcement strategies can 
improve both compliance with workers’ rights and firms’ productivity [10]. Providing 
inspectors with discretion, however, introduces the opportunity for corruption, an issue 
that does not yet seem to have been studied.
Compliance with workers’ rights can promote civic responsibilities 
Recent research shows that non-compliance with labor law can have important social 
costs. Evidence suggests that some workers in Latin American countries who do not 
receive the labor benefits to which they are legally entitled are often alienated—not only 
from their employer—but also from the state. They believe that the state did not protect 
their rights, and reciprocate by not complying with their civic duties (e.g. voting and paying 
taxes). That is, employer non-compliance with labor legislation erodes workers’ likelihood 
of fulfilling their citizenship responsibilities. This result is important for policymakers. 
Either achieving de facto (instead of de jure) labor market flexibility by turning a blind eye 
to employer non-compliance, or enacting employment protection legislation, but then 
failing to devote sufficient resources to enforcement, produces more social costs than 
previously thought. The large gap between the written intent of the law and actual labor 
practices that is so pervasive in less developed countries contributes to the erosion of civic 
responsibilities [11]. 
Demand for labor regulation
The large majority of workers in the developing world (either formal or informal, 
employed or unemployed) express their support for protective employment regulations. 
Furthermore, protective labor codes have usually been enacted by democratically elected 
governments. Increasing compliance is thus necessary to respect citizens’ preferences, 
and a key instrument to achieve this objective is enforcement.
Labor economists usually base their policy recommendations on theoretical insights and 
empirical estimates of the economic effects of the analyzed policy. The idea is that once the 
true parameters of the labor market are estimated through careful empirical analysis, then 
policymakers would be able to design welfare enhancing labor policies. When it comes to 
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labor regulation, in most cases the recommendation is to reduce stringent employment 
protection regulations or to keep them as they are. It could be argued that, despite much 
effort, this approach has only achieved partial success, mainly due to difficulties solving the 
problems of endogeneity that pervade non-experimental studies. An alternative approach 
is to directly ask voters which labor regulations they prefer. This approach could have 
some important shortcomings of its own (e.g. some people could report what is socially 
acceptable instead of what they really prefer), but is nevertheless informative and can 
complement the more traditional economics literature. 
Contrary to the predictions of the insider−outsider model, which indicates that protective 
labor regulations hurt so-called outsiders (i.e. unemployed and informal workers) 
[12], the large majority of workers in the developing world, including the outsiders, 
support protective labor codes. With this in mind, why then do democratically elected 
governments in the developing world devote such comparatively few resources to 
enforcing labor regulations if there is such a demand for it? Furthermore, why do they 
usually devote those few resources to inspecting registered firms, instead of focusing on 
informal firms where non-compliance with workers’ rights is more likely to occur?
Unfortunately, there does not seem to be a reasonably informed answer to these 
questions. A potential, and very speculative explanation, is that the costs of inspection 
take place in the short term (e.g. inspectors’ salaries and informal job destruction) 
while the benefits take more time to materialize (e.g. better working conditions and 
rule of law). Because inspection agencies in the developing world are controlled by the 
executive branch, they have short-term horizons (e.g. the next election) and tend to 
underinvest in enforcement. This is, however, very speculative. The political economy 
of labor enforcement is a field with many questions and few answers. One point that 
does appear clear though is that the low levels of enforcement in the developing world 
cannot be explained exclusively by resource constraints; withholding sanctions can be 
the optimal strategy for a politician [13].
LIMITATIONS AND GAPS
There are plenty of shortcomings in the available literature, as mentioned frequently 
above. An important factor to add to this is the practical difficulties involved in 
measuring some components of enforcement. In particular, very little is known about 
the number or size of fines and penalties imposed by labor enforcement agencies in 
the developing world, nor whether those fines are effectively collected. While fines are 
conceptually a key variable, there does not seem to be any available study providing 
this information.
SUMMARY AND POLICY ADVICE
The academic literature has both strengths and limitations when it comes to providing 
inputs for designing feasible welfare-enhancing labor policies. On the one hand, the 
literature provides policymakers with a very useful guideline that consists of three central 
topics. First, policymakers should determine the extent of imperfections in the analyzed 
labor market. Second, they should consider the preferences of workers and business 
owners while also identifying key actors and veto players. Third, they should take into 
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account the characteristics of local enforcement institutions. On the other hand, the 
number of countries and topics that have been studied represents a very small proportion 
of the affected population. Because there is no “one-size-fits-all” recipe for effective labor 
regulation, policymakers have to go beyond the academic literature, and understand the 
local particularities if they are to design feasible welfare enhancing policies.
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